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Abstract We introduce the prediction value (PV) of player i as the difference between
the conditional expectations of v(S) when i cooperates or not in a probabilistic TU
game. The latter combines a standard TU game and a probability distribution over
the set of coalitions. The PV reflects the importance of information about a given
player’s behavior for predicting, e.g., committee decisions that are subject to opinion
interdependencies. The PV is characterized by anonymity, linearity, a consistency
requirement and two normalization conditions. Every multinomial probabilistic value,
hence every binomial semivalue, coincides with the PV for a particular family of
probability distributions. So the PV can be regarded as a power index in specific cases.
Conversely, some semivalues—including the Banzhaf but not the Shapley value—can
be interpreted in terms of informational importance.
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1 Introduction
Concepts of power and importance in models of cooperation are central to numerous
studies in sociology, political science, mathematics, and economics. Much of the
literature applies values or power indices which attribute fixed roles—often perfectly
symmetric—to all players in the underlying coalition formation process and then focus
on their marginal contributions. Most prominent examples are the Shapley value and
Banzhaf value (Shapley 1953; Banzhaf 1965); others can be found in Roth (1988),
Owen (1995), Felsenthal and Machover (1998) or Laruelle and Valenciano (2008b).
The values differ in how marginal contributions to distinct coalitions are weighted.
With an appropriate rescaling, weights on specific marginal contributions can
always be interpreted as a probability distribution. So Shapley value, Banzhaf value,
and more generally probabilistic values (Weber 1988) correspond to the expecta-
tion of a difference. This difference is between the worth of a random coalition S
which is drawn from 2N\i according to a value-specific probability distribution Pi
and the worth of the same coalition when i joins. That is, a probabilistic value equals
EPi [v(S ∪ i) − v(S)] for a fixed family of distributions {Pi }i∈N .1
Unless the probabilistic value in question is also a (multibinary or) multinomial
probabilistic value (cf. Puente 2000; Freixas and Puente 2002; Carreras and Puente
2015a), the presence of player i in the realized coalition S can statistically depend
on whether player j = i belongs to it or not. This may plausibly be the case, for
example, when voting is preceded by a process of information transmission or opin-
ion formation.2 Unfortunately the expectation EPi [v(S ∪ i) − v(S)], interpreted as
power or importance of player i , can behave in strange ways when the family of dis-
tributions {Pi }i∈N implicates correlated behavior. The following example illustrates
the conceptual problem.3
Example 1 Consider the canonical simple majority decision rule with an assembly
of 5 voters. Let P be the probability distribution that assigns probability 0 to the
20 coalitions containing exactly two or exactly three voters; and equal probability
of 1/12 to each of the remaining 12 coalitions. Irrespective of whether we derive
Pi by projecting P to 2N\i or by conditioning P on i /∈ S, the probabilistic value
EPi [v(S ∪ i)− v(S)] is zero for all players. However, that nomember of this decision
body should have any voting power or importance is somewhat counterintuitive.
Here, the expectation of a difference is uninformative since non-zero marginal
contributions v(S ∪ i) − v(S) > 0 do not count when the underlying probability
distribution P treats S ∪ i and S as null events. More generally, the problem with
the expected marginal contribution EPi [v(S ∪ i) − v(S)] is that it treats i’s decision,
1 It is equivalent to consider suitable probability distributions Pi on {S ∈ 2N : i ∈ S} and then to evaluate
EPi [v(S) − v(S\i)]. We adopt the usual notational simplifications like writing S\i or S ∪ i j instead of
S\{i} or S ∪ {i, j}.
2 See, for example, the seminal opinion formation model of DeGroot (1974): individuals start with initial
opinions (beliefs) on a subject represented by an n-dimensional vector of probabilities, and repeatedly
update their individual opinion based on the current opinions of their peers. Different structures of consensus
formation can be captured by different network topologies.
3 We owe this example to Moshé Machover.
123
The prediction value 435
say, to change her no vote into a yes (or vice versa) as being fully detached from the
respective probabilities of observing the considered two coalitions with and without
i .
This paper proposes an alternative approach: namely, to consider the difference
of two expectations. These expectations will be derived from a given probabilistic
description P of coalition formation. The latter plays the same role as {Pi }i∈N does
for probabilistic values or corresponding families {Pvi }i∈N do for values that evaluate
marginal contributions in game v-specific ways.4 However, we take P as a primitive
of the collective decision situation under investigation, rather than of the solution
concept.
We thus depart from most of the previous literature in two respects: first, similar to
Laruelle andValenciano (2008a), we explicitly consider probabilistic games (N , v, P)
where (N , v) is a standard TU game and P is a probability distribution on N ’s power
set 2N . Second, we introduce a new value that reflects the difference between two
conditional expectations. Specifically, we define the prediction value (PV) of any
given player i ∈ N as the difference in v’s expected value when the distribution P|i
which conditions P on the event {i ∈ S} and the distribution P|¬i which conditions on
{i /∈ S} are applied. In other words, we suggest to evaluate EP|i [v(S)] − EP|¬i [v(S)]
instead of EPi [v(S ∪ i)− v(S)]. The two coincide in interesting special cases, but not
in general. In particular, our approach is similar in spirit but factually differs from the
evaluation of conditional decisiveness as in Laruelle and Valenciano (2005, 2008a).
The margin between the respective conditional expectations can be interpreted as
the importance of a player in the probabilistic game (N , v, P) in several ways. Most
generally, it captures the informational or predictive value of knowing i’s decision in
advance of the processwhich divides N into somefinal coalition S and its complement.
Moreover, in case i’s membership of the coalition which supports a specific bill or
cooperates in a joint venture is statistically independent of others, the PV provides a
measure of i’s influence on the outcome of collective decision making, or of i’s power
in (N , v, P).
The existing literature—the references above are a small selection—obviously does
not suffer from a shortage of solution concepts in general, nor of ones targeted at
quantifying a player’s power in TU games. But as Aumann (1987) argued: “Different
solution concepts are like different indicators of an economy; different methods for
calculating a price index; different maps (road, topo, political, geologic, etc., not
to speak of scale, projection, etc.); …They depict or illuminate the situation from
different angles; each one stresses certain aspects at the expense of others.” Taking
up Aumann’s metaphor, we do not suggest another scale or projection of a player’s
vector of marginal contributions here. We rather propose to look at a slightly different
kind of map. For some situations—involving statistically independent cooperation
decisions—the picture may look identical to that generated by, say, the Banzhaf value
(giving the latter additional force/basis/clout); in others, such as Example 1, it will
provide a new perspective.
4 This is, for instance, the case when positive probability is attached only to minimal winning coalitions
(see, e.g. Holler 1982 and Holler and Li 1995).
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Example 1 (continued) In the considered assembly, the probability of coalition S was
P(S) = 0 for |S| = 2 or |S| = 3 and P(S) = 1/12 otherwise. The respective
conditional probabilities follow from Bayes’ rule. In particular, knowing that player i











6 if S = ∅ or S = { j}, j = i or S = N\i,
0 otherwise,
(2)
in case i is known not to cooperate. The expected value of v(S), which corresponds
to the probability that the assembly passes the proposal in question, is changed by the
observation that, say, voter 1 supports rather than opposes it by
EP|1[v(S)] − EP|¬1[v(S)] =
∑
S1
v(S) · P|1(S) −
∑
T 1








The information that player 1 votes in a particular way is not enough to predict an
assemblydecisionperfectly. (Thatwouldbe the case ifEP|1[v(S)]−EP|¬1[v(S)] = 1).
But it changes the odds significantly. Player 1 may not have voting power in the
traditional sense, but his or her vote is important from an informational perspective. It
may be quite valuable to investors or speculators, for instance. The same applies here
to the other members of the assembly to identical degrees. Asymmetric voting weights
or asymmetric roles in opinion dynamics and coalition formation would naturally give
rise to different PV numbers for the respective assembly members.
A null player who has a voting weight that cannot matter for matching a required
majority threshold and whose behavior is uncorrelated with the remaining players has
a PV of zero. Endowing the same player with greater voting weight will at some point
translate into a positive value—reflecting the difference that her vote can nowmake for
the outcome, just like traditional indices. But leaving initial votingweights unchanged,
the PV will also ascribe positive importance to the null player if interdependencies
make its cooperation a predictor of whether a proposal is passed.
Plausible causes for dependencies abound and, for instance, include the possibility
that the player in question is actually without vote but ‘followed’ by the official voters
as, say, their paramount leader. The proposed change of perspective—from, tradition-
ally, the expected difference that a player wouldmake by an ad-hoc change of coalition
membership towards the difference in expectations for the collective outcome which
is associated with that player’s cooperation—opens the route to studying voting and
coalition formation as the result of social interaction. Final votes may be determined
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by whether i is initially a supporter or opponent even if i is a null player of (N , v),
and this is arguably a source of power just like official voting weight. We believe
that evaluating changes in conditional expectations can help to quantify this in future
research.
Here, we introduce and investigate properties of the prediction value. We formally
define it in Sect. 3, after collecting some preliminaries in Sect. 2. We describe a set of
characteristic properties in Sect. 4 and relate the PV to traditional probabilistic values
in Sect. 5. The considered distributions P could embody the a prioristic presumptions
of traditional power measures, i.e., be the uniform distribution on 2N or the space
of permutations on N . (Interestingly, the latter does not make PV and Shapley value
coincide). But P could equally well be based on empirical data—say, observations of
past voting behavior in a decision making body like the US Congress, EU Council,
etc. We briefly conduct such a posteriori analysis with the PV in an application to the
Dutch Parliament in Sect. 6, and we conclude in Sect. 7. All mathematical proofs are
contained in the Appendix.
2 Preliminaries
A TU game is an ordered pair (N , v) where N ⊂ N represents a non-empty, finite
set of players and v : 2N → R is the characteristic function which specifies the worth
v(S) of any subset or coalition S ⊆ N and satisfies v(∅) = 0. The set of all TU games
is denoted by G, and the set of all TU games with player set N by GN .
(N , v) ∈ G is a simple game if v is a monotone Boolean function, i.e., v(S) ∈ {0, 1}
and v(S) ≤ v(S′) for all S ⊆ S′ ⊆ N , such that v(∅) = 0 and v(N ) = 1. A coalition
S with v(S) = 1 is then called winning. Given any non-empty coalition S ⊆ N , the
so-called unanimity game uS is defined by uS(T ) = 1 if S ⊆ T and uS(T ) = 0
otherwise. We will drop the player set N from our notation when it is clear from the
context; so uS is shorthand for (N , uS). Moreover, we refer to u{i} simply as ui .
Player i is called a dummy player in (N , v) if v(S ∪ i) − v(S) = v(i) for all
S ⊆ N\i . Every player i with v(i) = 0 is said to be dependent. A dummy player who
is dependent is also known as a null player. If (N , v) is a simple game and v(S) = 1
if and only if i ∈ S, then player i is called a dictator.
TU games (N , v) have explicitly been combined with probability distributions P
over coalitions S ⊆ N since Owen (1972). P is typically mentioned in order to
provide probabilistic motivation or foundations for a particular solution concept, not
as a characteristic of a collective decision making situation. We want to emphasize
its role as a primitive and define a probabilistic game as an ordered triple (N , v, P),
where (N , v) is a TU game and P is a probability distribution on the power set of N ,
2N . The set of all probabilistic games is denoted by PG; and PGN is the restriction
to the class of probabilistic games with player set N .
A TU value is a function which assigns a real number to all elements of N for any
given TU game. An extended value is a mapping ϕ that assigns to each probabilistic
game (N , v, P) a vector ϕ(N , v, P) ∈ R|N |. ϕi (N , v, P) will be interpreted as a
measure of the ‘difference’, in an abstract sense, that player i makes for the probabilistic
game (N , v, P). It might, for instance, relate to the average of marginal contributions
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v(S∪ i)−v(S) that are made by i to coalitions S ∈ N\i , to the difference that i makes
to a potential function (i.e., a mapping from PG to R) when i is added to the player
set N ′ such that N ′ ∪ i = N , or to any other indicator of how important the behavior
or presence of player i might be to the members of N or an outside observer.
TU values and extended values are defined on two distinct domains, G and PG.
Extended values can be regarded as technically the more general concept because any
givenTUvalue can be turned into an extended value simply by ignoring the distribution
P that is specified as part of (N , v, P). For instance,
φi (N , v, P) =
∑
S i
|S|!(|N | − |S| − 1)!
|N |! (v(S ∪ i) − v(S)) (4)
correspondingly ‘extends’ the Shapley value and the (extended) Banzhaf value can be
defined by5




(v(S ∪ i) − v(S)). (5)
Both the original Shapley TU value and the Banzhaf TU value (which was at first
restricted to simple games, and later extended to general TU games by Owen 1975)
are special instances of probabilistic values, as introduced by Weber (1988).6 They
are defined by
i (N , v, Q) =
∑
Si
Qi (S)(v(S) − v(S\i)) = EQi [v(S) − v(S\i)] (6)
such that each element Qi of the collection Q = {Qi }i∈N denotes a probability
distribution on {S ⊆ 2N : i ∈ S}, or




Q′i (S)(v(S ∪ i) − v(S)) = EQ′i [v(S ∪ i) − v(S)] (7)
such that Q′i denotes a probability distribution on 2N\i .7
Several subclasses of probabilistic values have received special attention. Semival-
ues satisfy (6) and (7) for weights Qi (S) and Q′i (S), respectively, which are identical
for all i ∈ N and depend on S only via its cardinality |S| (Dubey et al. 1981). Then
for all i ∈ N
i (N , v, Q
′) = f qi (N , v) =
∑
S⊆N\i
q|S| · (v(S ∪ i) − v(S)) (8)









S⊆N : i∈S .
6 Weber (1988) originally defined a “probabilistic value” for each individual player i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and
referred to the corresponding n-vector as a group value. We follow the later terminology of Monderer and
Samet (2002).
7 The argument (N , v, Q) in (6) and (7) is more general than a probabilistic game. The latter follows as
the special case in which each Qi stems from the same probability distribution Q.
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qk = 1. (9)
The Shapley value arises by setting qk = 1n(n−1k ) ; the Banzhaf index for qk =
1
2n−1 .
The latter—but not the former—is also a binomial semivalue: there exists 0 < p < 1
such that (8) holds for
qk = pk(1 − p)n−k−1 for k = 0, . . . , n − 1. (10)
See Dubey et al. (1981), Carreras and Freixas (2008), and Carreras and Puente (2012).
Multinomial values have been introduced by Puente (2000) and are obtained from
(6) or (7) by requiring that each player j is part of the formed coalition with probability
p˜ j independently of any other player.8 Let g
p˜
i (N , v) denote the multinomial value of
player i for a fixed vector p˜ = ( p˜1, . . . , p˜n) ∈ [0, 1]n . Then for all i ∈ N
i (N , v, Q








(1− p˜ j ) · (v(S ∪ i) − v(S)).
(11)
3 The prediction value
For a given probabilistic game (N , v, P) define the conditional probability distribu-






P(T ) if i ∈ S and
∑
Ti









P(T ) if i /∈ S and
∑
T i
P(T ) = 0,
0 otherwise.
(13)
Laruelle and Valenciano (2005) have suggested to consider the conditional decisive-
ness measures
8 Carreras and Puente (2015a) illustrate possibilities to connect probabilities p˜1, . . . , p˜n to political posi-
tions on a left-to-right axis. See Giménez et al. (2014) and Carreras and Puente (2015b) for applications
of multinomial values to partnership formation and coalition structures in cooperative games. Properties of
multinomial values, such as their monotonicity with respect to v, are studied by Domènech et al. (2016).
Calvo and Santos (2000), among others, discuss further subclasses of probabilistic values such as weighted
Shapley values, weak semivalues or weighted weak semivalues.
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+i (N , v, P) = EP|i [v(S) − v(S\i)] (14)
and
−i (N , v, P) = EP|¬i [v(S ∪ i) − v(S)], (15)
as indicators of player i’s importance in (N , v, P).9 It is easy to see that
+(N , v, P) = −(N , v, P) = β(N , v, P) if and only if P(S) ≡ 2−|N | for all
S ⊆ N , and one can similarly obtain identity with the (extended) Shapley value.
Namely,






if S = ∅,
(16)
−(N , v, P) = φ(N , v, P) ⇐⇒ P(N ) = 0, P(S) = 1
(n − s)(ns)∑nt=1 1t if S =N
(17)
with n = |N | and s = |S| (see Laruelle and Valenciano 2005, Prop. 3).10
We propose an altogether different approach to assessing the importance of N ’s
members in a probabilistic game (N , v, P). It is not based on probabilistic values, nor
marginal contributions in general. Weighted marginal contributions may misrepresent
player i’s importance in (N , v, P) in that they implicitly treat i’s decision, say, to
change her no vote into a yes (or vice versa) as being fully detached from the respective
probabilities of observing the considered two coalitions with and without i . Example 1
already highlighted the effect that non-zeromarginal contributions v(S∪i)−v(S) > 0
do not count when the underlying probability distribution P treats both events S∪i and
S as null events. Adding up marginal contributions also leads to strange conclusions
if only one of the coalitions S and S ∪ i has positive probability.
Example 2 Consider an assembly of 3 voters in which coalitions {1, 3}, {2, 3} and
{1, 2, 3} are winning. Assume voters 2 and 3 are enemies and always vote contrary
to each other. Here, coalition S = {1, 2} might have positive probability under P and
P|¬3, while P(N ) = 0. A problem for measures like −(N , v, P) is then that they
are strictly increased by a contribution which 3 makes in the null event of joining
S = {1, 2}.
One thing that outside observers, members j = i of N or i herself might still care
about in the examples is the informational gain that comes with the knowledge: “i
will (not) be part of the eventually formed coalition”. Knowing this might imply that j
cannot (ormust) be amongst themembers of the coalition. Thismay have ramifications
9 Laruelle and Valenciano (2008a) refer to +i (N , v, P) as player i’s “interim expected marginal contri-
bution” and identify its relations with different classes of probabilistic values.
10 Note that the respective distributions P which need to be assumed in order to obtain the Shapley value
as a conditional expected marginal contribution in (16) and (17) differ.
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for the expected surplus that is created or the passage probability of the bill being
debated. In other words, it may be useful to base one’s evaluation of collective decision
making as described by (N , v, P) on P|i rather than P when i is known to support the
decision. This suggests looking at the difference EP|i [v(S)] − EP [v(S)] as a way of
quantifying i’s effect on the outcome. And it is arguably of similar interest—and may
yield a rather different quantification of the difference that i’s decision makes—not to
look at how much i’s support increases the expected worth v(S) but at how much i’s
opposition lowers it, i.e., EP [v(S)] − EP|¬i [v(S)]. Combining these two evaluations
of how knowledge of i’s decision changes the expectation of the game by summing
them, we obtain:
Definition 1 The prediction value (PV) of player i in the probabilistic game (N , v, P)
is defined as




v(S) · P|i(S) −
∑
T i
v(T ) · P|¬i(T ). (18)
Remark 1 In case that coalition membership is statistically independent for every
i = j , i.e., if P is a product measure on 2N , the equality P | i(S) = P |¬i(S\i)
holds whenever i ∈ S. Then equations (14), (15), and (18) all evaluate to the same
number—for instance, to the Banzhaf value if P(S) ≡ 2−|N |. That the “expectation of
a difference” in (14) or (15) coincides with the “difference between two expectations”
in (18), however, fails to hold in general. In particular, we will show in Corollary 2
that there is no probability distribution P which would allow the Shapley value to be
interpreted as measuring informational importance.
Remark 2 The restriction of the prediction value to simple games has been identi-
fied by Häggström et al. (2006) as playing a key role in extending the Condorcet
jury theorem (on asymptotically correct simple majority decisions by n statistically
independent voters) to weighted majority decisions with arbitrary joint vote distribu-
tions.11 Häggström et al. call the difference between expectations based on P|i and
P|¬i the “effect” of voter i . Their observation that player i’s effect can be interpreted
as a normalized form of the correlation between i’s vote and the random jury outcome
extends straightforwardly to probabilistic TU games. Namely, writing 1{i∈S} for the
indicator function of event {i ∈ S} and pi = P({S : i ∈ S}), the covariance of v(S)
and 1{i∈S} is
Cov(v(S), 1{i∈S}) = EP [[v(S) · 1{i∈S}] − EP [v(S)] · EP [1{i∈S}] (19)
= EP [v(S) · (1{i∈S} − EP [1{i∈S}])]
11 Neeman (2014) further extended the analysis to weighted plurality decisions.
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= piEP [v(S) · (1 − pi )|i ∈ S] + (1 − pi )EP [−piv(S)|i /∈ S]
= pi (1 − pi ) · ξi (N , v, P). (20)
Dividing by standard deviations σv(S) and σ1{i∈S} =
√
pi (1 − pi ), the PV and the
correlation coefficient Corr(v(S), 1{i∈S}) can be seen to satisfy
ξi (N , v, P) = Corr(v(S), 1{i∈S}) · σv(S)√
pi (1 − pi ) . (21)
4 Characterizing the prediction value
We will now provide an axiomatic characterization of the prediction value. We begin
with two classical conditions that are part of many axiomatic systems in the literature
on TU values. The first is anonymity, which requires that the indicated difference to
the game that is ascribed to any player by an extended value does not depend on the
labeling of the players. The second is linearity, which demands of an extended value
that it is linear in the characteristic function component v of probabilistic games.
Definition 2 Consider two probabilistic games G = (N , v, P) and G ′ = (N ′, v′, P ′)
related through a bijection π : N → N ′ such that for all S ⊆ N , v(S) = v′(π S) and
P(S) = P ′(π S) where π S := {π(i)|i ∈ S}. An extended value ϕ is anonymous if for
every such G and G ′ ∈ PG
ϕi (N , v, P) = ϕπ(i)(N ′, v′, P ′) for all i ∈ N . (22)
Definition 3 An extended value ϕ is linear if for all (N , v, P), (N , v′, P) ∈ PG and
real constants α, β
ϕ(N , αv + βv′, P) = αϕ (N , v, P) + βϕ(N , v′, P). (23)
Linearity combines two properties, scale invariance and additivity. Especially the
latter is far from being innocuous.12 But linearity is frequently imposed on solution
concepts for TU games; and the PV, as the difference of two expectations, embraces
it rather naturally.
The third characteristic property of the PV concerns the way how the respective
extended values of two gamesG andG ′ compare when one can be viewed as a reduced
form of the other.
Definition 4 Given G = (N , v, P) ∈ PG and a dependent player i ∈ N , the prob-
abilistic game G−i = (N−i , v−i , P−i ) ∈ PG is a reduced game derived from G by
12 See, e.g., Felsenthal and Machover (1998, 6.2.26) and Luce and Raiffa (1957, p. 248).
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removal of i if N−i = N\i , and for all S ⊆ N\i13




P(S)+P(S∪i) · v(S) + P(S∪i)P(S)+P(S∪i) v(S ∪ i) if P−i (S) > 0,
0 otherwise.
(25)
So, when one moves from a given probabilistic game G to the reduced game G−i ,
first, player i is removed from the set of players; second, the probabilities of all
coalitions in G which only differ concerning i’s presence are aggregated; and, third,
the corresponding new worth v−i (S) of coalitions S ⊆ N−i is the convex combination
of the associated old worths, v(S) and v(S ∪ i), weighted according to the respective
probabilities under P . We will require that the extended value of any player j ∈ N−i
stays unaffected by the removal of i .14
Definition 5 An extended value ϕ is consistent if for all G = (N , v, P) ∈ PG and
all dependent players i ∈ N in v, we have ϕ j (G) = ϕ j (G−i ) for all j ∈ N\i .
One reason for why this consistency property could be desirable is the following.
Suppose that the considered model is misspecified in the sense that a player of interest
in the game is not taken into account by the rest of the players (or an outside observer).
For instance, consider the situation of a voting gameG ′ = (N ′, v′, P ′), where the pres-
ence of a lobbyist i has been neglected. The more accurate model would include the
lobbyist and be G = (N ′ ∪ i, v, P). The effect of the lobbyist endorsing a proposal or
opposing it would explicitly be captured by the probability distribution P: for exam-
ple, voters with strong ties to i may be likely to vote the sameway, while others behave
oppositely. Coalitions S and S ∪ i which differ only in i’s presence will consequently
have very different P-probabilities depending on whether S includes i’s fellow trav-
elers or opponents. But if the probability P ′ and value v′ of each coalition T ⊆ N ′ in
the ‘misspecified’ game without i are defined in a probabilistically correct way, i.e., if
the misspecified game G ′ equals G−i , then the assessment of any actor j = i should
be unaffected by whether one considers G or G−i . Consistency can thus be seen as
formalizing robustness to probabilistically correct misspecifications.
Proposition 1 The prediction value is anonymous, linear, and consistent.
Proposition 1 is not enough to fully characterize the PV. For instance, for every
a, b ∈ R, the extended value ϕ(a,b)i (N , v, P) = a · EP|i [v(S)] + b · EP|¬i [v(S)]
satisfies anonymity, linearity and consistency.15
13 This definition of v−i (S) differentiates our reduction operation from the one in Laruelle and Valenciano
(2008a, p. 76), which allows to interpret the expected values of v and v−i in terms of a potential function
in special cases (cf. Hart and Mas-Colell 1989). Note that if i were not a dependent player, i.e., v(i) = 0,
then v−i would not be a well-defined TU game because v−i (∅) = 0 in this case.
14 The condition is vaguely reminiscent of the amalgamation properties considered by Lehrer (1988) or
Casajus (2012).
15 To see this, observe that the desired properties are attained by the extended values considered in
Lemma 1(i) and (ii) below, and are preserved by linear combinations.
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Our characterization in Theorem 1 below will use that if an extended value is
linear and consistent, it is fully determined by its image for the subclass of all 2-
player probabilistic games.16 The question then is how the extended values of 2-player
probabilistic games should suitably be restricted.
Before giving an answer it is worth recalling two implications of i being part of the
formed coalition: first, i’s presence means that i contributes to the formed coalition
her voting weight, productivity, etc. This reveals information about the expected worth
directly. But, second, i’s presence also affects the expected worth indirectly because
it reveals information about the presence and contributions of other players if the
behavior of N\i and of i are not statistically independent. In case of independence, i.e.,
if the presence of i ∈ N has no informational value according to P , and if moreover
i is a null player in the TU-game (N , v), then a reasonable extended value can be
expected to assign zero to i . If, in contrast, knowledge of the behavior of null player
i does change the odds of a proposal being passed, then i has positive informational
value.
For illustration, consider a voting game in which j is a dictator according to the
rules formalized by v. Let the voting behavior of j be perfectly correlated with that of
some other player i (formally a null player). Now note that it is not part of the model
(N , v, P), which mathematically describes the rules of the collective decision body
involving i and j and the random outcomes of coalition formation processes, why
the votes of i and j always coincide. ‘Null player’ i might simply follow ‘dictator’ j
in all his decisions. Alternatively, player i could be irrelevant merely from a formal
perspective, i.e., have no say de jure; while it is her who imposes all her wishes on
j—that is, she rules de facto. In either case the informational values of i and j are
identical. They are also maximal (and could plausibly be normalized to, say, 1) in the
sense that the outcome can be predicted perfectly when knowing that i or j votes yes
or no.
We combine the requirement that an independent null player i should be assigned an
extended value of zero with the requirement that i has a value of one in the considered
perfect correlation case as follows:17
Definition 6 Anextendedvalueϕ satisfies the informational dummy-dictator property
(IDDP) if for i ∈ N and |N | = 2
ϕi ({i, j}, u j , P) = P|i(i j) − P|¬i( j). (26)
Regarding dictators themselves it makes sense to impose the following for 1-player
probabilistic games:
16 Lemma 3 below allows to characterize all anonymous, linear and consistent extended values by setting
ϕi ({i, j}, u j , P) := fi j (P) and ϕi ({i}, ui , P) := gi (P) for anonymous functions f, g. The latter can
depend on P in arbitrary anonymous ways. This is why the properties in Proposition 1 do not yield an
analogue to Weber’s (1988) elegant marginal contributions-based formula for linear positive values which
have the dummy property, i.e., probabilistic values.
17 The case of independence corresponds to P|i(i j) = P|¬i( j), while the correlated dictator case amounts
to P|i(i j) = 1 and P|¬i( j) = 0.
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Definition 7 An extended value ϕ satisfies full control if ϕi ({i}, ui , P) = 1 for all
i, P where P({i}) > 0, and ϕi ({i}, ui , P) = 0 otherwise.
This formalizes that if N consists of just a single player i ∈ Nwith v(i) = ui (i) = 1
then i’s importance or the difference that i makes to this game should plausibly be
evaluated as unity. Immediately from the definition of the PV we obtain.
Proposition 2 The prediction value satisfies full control and IDDP.
Remark 3 IDDP implies a positive extended value for a null player i even if i’s
behavior is imperfectly but still positively correlated with that of a dictator j . This
is, e.g., the case when a yes-vote by i is made more likely by most other players
voting yes, i.e., for the implicit probabilistic model behind the Shapley value. For a
probabilistic gamewith a dictatorwhere P reflects anyShapley value-like probabilistic
assumptions, this means that PV and Shapley value φ will not coincide because the
Shapley value of null players is zero.
We have the following characterization result:
Theorem 1 There is a unique extended value ϕ which satisfies linearity, consistency,
full control and IDDP. It is anonymous and ϕ ≡ ξ .
We note that the four properties in Theorem 1 are independent and non-redundant.
Lemma 1 (i) The extended value
ϕ1i (N , v, P) =
∑
S⊆N ,i∈S
αS · EP|i (uS) , (27)
with v = ∑S⊆N αS · uS being the unique decomposition of v into unanimity
games, satisfies linearity, consistency, full control but not IDDP.
(ii) The extended value
ϕ2i (N , v, P) = ξi (N , v, P) − ϕ1i (N , v, P) (28)
satisfies linearity, consistency, IDDP but not full control.
(iii) The extended value








v(T ) · P|¬i(T ) (29)
satisfies linearity, full control, IDDP but not consistency.
(iv) Let |N | ≥ 3 and v = ∑S⊆N αS · uS. The extended value
ϕ4i (N , v, P) =
∑
S⊆N ,αS =0
ξi (N , uS, P) (30)
satisfies consistency, full control, IDDP but not linearity.
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5 Relation between prediction value and probabilistic values
The example values discussed earlier (like φ, β,+,−) all are probabilistic values,
i.e., they have in common that they weight marginal contributions of a player by
some probability measure. We already noted in Remark 1 that the natural extension
of the Banzhaf value agrees with the prediction value if P(S) ≡ 2−|N |. We now
study the relationship between (extended) probabilistic values and the prediction value
somewhat more generally.
Following Weber (1988), the class of probabilistic values is characterized by (i)
linearity, (ii) positivity: ϕ(N , v, P) ≥ 0 if v is monotonic and (iii) the dummy player
property: ϕi (N , v, P) = v(i) if i is a dummy. The PV is not a probabilistic value. It
is linear (see Proposition 1) but violates (ii) and (iii).18
Theorem 2 Let  be a probabilistic value as defined in (6). The identity (·, Q) ≡
ξ(·, P) holds for n > 1 if and only if there exist probabilities 0 < p˜i < 1 for each
player such that






(1 − p˜ j ) (31)







(1 − p˜ j ) (32)
holds for all S ⊆ N.
The theorem shows that a probabilistic value  is a PV if and only if it is
a multinomial value g p˜, i.e., satisfies (11), for an interior vector of probabilities
p˜ = ( p˜1, . . . , p˜n). This also clarifies the connection between semivalues and the
prediction value. Namely, a semivalue f q can be interpreted as a PV if and only if f q
is also a multinomial value g p˜. Identity f q ≡ g p˜ and the fact that weightings Qi (S)
can depend only on |S| for semivalues imply (i) p˜i = p˜ j =: p for all i, j ∈ N in
Theorem 2 and (ii) q satisfies (10) for p. So we obtain:
Corollary 1 For a given semivalue f q and n > 1 there exists P such that f q(·) ≡
ξ(·, P) on GN if and only if f q is a binomial semivalue, i.e., q satisfies (10) for some
p ∈ (0, 1).19
Because the Shapley value φ is no binomial semivalue and differs from any such value
on GN when |N | ≥ 3, we have:
Corollary 2 For n ≥ 3 there exists no P such that φ(·) ≡ ξ(·, P) on GN .
18 See Remark 3 on the possibility of ξi (N , v, P) > 0 for a null player i . Positivity is violated, e.g., for the
dummy-dicator setting (26) when i and j always vote contrary such that P|i(i j) = 0 and P|¬i( j) = 1.
19 In some definitions in the literature the extreme cases p = 0 and p = 1 are allowed, too, with the
convention 00 = 1. For p = 0 we would get the dictatorial index and for p = 1 the marginal index. See
Owen (1978) for details. However, note that neither p = 0 nor p = 1 satisfy the conditions fromTheorem 2.
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6 Prediction values in the Dutch Parliament 2008–2010
As illustration of the prediction value’s practical applicability and of how its infor-
mational importance indications can be very different from power ascriptions by
traditional values, we consider the seat distribution and voting behavior in the Dutch
Parliament between 2008 and 2010. This was the period of the left-centered Balke-
nende IV government, which consisted of Christian democrats from the CDA and
Christen Unie parties and the social democratic PvdA.
The distribution of the 150 seats in parliament between its eleven parties is displayed
in the top part of Table 1. The three government parties held amajority of 80 out of 150
seats. When voting on non-constitutional propositions, the Dutch Parliament applies
simplemajority rule. It is straightforward to define a voting gamewith this information,
and to calculate the corresponding a priori Banzhaf and Shapley values β and φ.
We used the parliamentary information system Parlis20 in order to extract infor-
mation on members, meetings, votes and decisions on propositions in the 2008–2010
period. From the records of regular plenary voting rounds,where parties vote as blocks,
we derived the empirical frequencies of the 211 conceivable divisions into yes and
no-camps from 2720 observations.21 Defining P by these empirical frequencies, we
calculated the corresponding prediction values ξi of the parties as well as their positive
and negative conditional decisiveness values +i and 
−
i defined in (14) and (15). A
summary of the results is given in the bottom part of Table 1.
The PV-scores ξi of Dutch parties tend to be higher than their respective traditional
Banzhaf or Shapley power measures βi and φi , and even the decisiveness measures
+i and 
−
i which incorporate the same empirical estimate of P . In particular, the
prediction value ascribes rather substantial numbers also to small parties like D66,
SGP, or Verdonk.
This reflects specificities of the political situation in the Netherlands and that the PV
picks up corresponding correlations between the voting behavior of different parties.
Varying majorities at calls are quite common in the Dutch Parliament. The member
parties of the government do not necessarily vote the same way; some are frequently
supportedby smaller oppositionparties. The correlation coefficients reported inTable2
indicate, for instance, that SGP and D66 quite commonly voted the same way as CU
and PvdA. Their PV numbers hence differ much less than their seat shares.
Verdonk and SP constitute an extreme case in this respect. The former is commonly
considered as far right-wing, the latter as a far left-wing party; still both voted the
same way at each call in the data set (presumably having different reasons). Perfect
correlation of their votes implies that both have the same prediction value—despite SP
having25 seats andVerdonkbut one: knowing either’s vote in advancewould havebeen
equally valuable for predictive purposes.Measures based onmarginal contributions, in
20 The data is available through http://data.appsvoordemocratie.nl.
21 We pooled all regular plenary votes in order to illustrate the simplest way in which data can be used to
infer interdependencies in a voting body—one might want to split the data with respect to topics, or weight
distinct calls by their importance, in actual political analysis. Note that the Dutch Parliament’s chairperson
assumes that parties vote as blocks unless some MP demands voting by call. Only then can members of the
same party vote differently. We excluded such cases of ‘non-coherent voting’ from our analysis.
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Table 2 Correlation coefficients for 2008–2010 votes in Dutch Parliament
CDA CU D66 GL PvdA PvdD PVV SGP SP Verdonk VVD
CDA 1.000 0.267 0.263 0.483 0.237 −0.044 0.324 0.221 −0.026 −0.026 0.012
CU 0.267 1.000 0.631 0.348 0.601 0.015 0.178 0.459 0.094 0.094 0.158
D66 0.263 0.631 1.000 0.348 0.811 0.044 0.169 0.693 0.034 0.034 −0.008
GL 0.483 0.348 0.348 1.000 0.315 −0.003 0.171 0.259 0.019 0.019 0.068
PvdA 0.237 0.601 0.811 0.315 1.000 0.040 0.161 0.714 0.027 0.027 −0.003
PvdD −0.044 0.015 0.044 −0.003 0.040 1.000 0.198 0.171 0.536 0.536 0.389
PVV 0.324 0.178 0.169 0.171 0.161 0.198 1.000 0.203 0.263 0.263 0.285
SGP 0.221 0.459 0.693 0.259 0.714 0.171 0.203 1.000 0.110 0.110 0.025
SP −0.026 0.094 0.034 0.019 0.027 0.536 0.263 0.110 1.000 1.000 0.554
Verdonk −0.026 0.094 0.034 0.019 0.027 0.536 0.263 0.110 1.000 1.000 0.554
VVD 0.012 0.158 −0.008 0.068 −0.003 0.389 0.285 0.025 0.554 0.554 1.000
contrast, clearly favor SP over Verdonk (though less so if the a posteriori correlation
between SP’s and Verdonk’s votes is ignored). Interestingly, the GL party has the
second-highest prediction value: despite it not being in government and having only
the sixth-largest seat share, support by GL was a better predictor of a bill’s success
than support by any except the biggest party (CDA).
7 Concluding remarks
Traditional semivalues like the Shapley or Banzhaf values and the prediction value
provide two qualitatively distinct perspectives on the importance of the members of
a collective decision body. One highlights the difference that an ad-hoc change of
a given player i’s membership in the coalition which eventually forms would make
from an ex ante perspective; the other stresses the difference that the change of a
player’s presumed membership makes for one’s ex ante assessment of realized worth.
As the figures in Table 1 illustrate, both can differ widely in case players’ behavior
exhibits interdependencies. But, as formalized by Theorem 2, they coincide in case of
statistical independence. The latter is presumed by the behavioral model underlying,
e.g., the Banzhaf value, but incompatible with that underlying the Shapley value.
For independent individual voting decisions, the conditioning on different votes of
player i adds no behavioral information to the formal fact of i’s weight contribution to
either the yes or no camp. Then i’s informational importance and i’s voting power or
influence—reflected by sensitivity of the collective decision to a last-minute change
of i’s behavior—are aligned.22
We note that the prediction value does not distinguish between correlation and cau-
sation in cases of interdependence. For illustration, consider decisions by a weighted
22 In the case of the Banzhaf value, coincidence between voter i’s influence as picked up by i’s average
marginal contribution and the informational effect of knowing i’s vote has been hinted at by Felsenthal and
Machover (1998, 3.2.12–15).
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voting body in which some player i has zero weight but all other players’ decisions are
perfectly correlated with that of i . Player i’s prediction value is then one irrespective
of whether (i) players j = i ‘follow’ i and cast their weight as their supreme leader i
would if he had any, (ii) i = k and all players j = k follow a specific other player k, or
(iii) all players debate the merit of a proposal based on different initial inclinations and
collective opinion dynamics converge to, for instance, themajority inclination.23 Since
knowing i’s decision—rather than i’s initial inclination—will always fully reveal the
realized outcome, we regard finding ξi = 1 in all three scenarios a feature, not a flaw.
However, this example points to an interesting extension of the described “dif-
ference of conditional expected values”-approach to measuring importance. Namely,
start with a given description (N , v, P) of a decision body where P corresponds to,
say, the Banzhaf uniform distribution and augment it by the formal description of a
social opinion formation process which defines a mapping from players’ binary initial
voting inclinations to a distribution over final ones after social interaction. One can
then capture a player i’s combined social and formal influence in the decision body by
answering the question: how much does knowing that i’s initial inclination is in favor
(or against) the given proposal modify the final outcome which is to be expected?
We conjecture that this approach actually has advantages over extending marginal
contribution-based analysis to social interaction,24 and plan to pursue this extension
in future research.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 Interna-
tional License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution,
and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the
source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
8 Appendix
8.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Anonymity and linearity of ξ are obvious from Definition 1. To prove consistency,
consider (N , v, P) ∈ PG and let i ∈ N be dependent in v. Let j ∈ N\i and S ⊆ N\i j .
Equations (12) and (24) imply that
P−i | j (S ∪ j) = P| j (S ∪ j) + P| j (S ∪ i ∪ j) (33)
and
P−i |¬ j (S) = P|¬ j (S) + P|¬ j (S ∪ i). (34)
23 See Grabisch and Rusinowska’s (2010) related work on possibilities to aggregate individual influence
in command structures.
24 See, for instance, the power scores derived from swings in societies with opinion leaders by van den
Brink et al. (2013).
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By using the definition of v−i and invoking equality (33) one can verify that
P−i | j (S ∪ j)v−i (S ∪ j)= P| j (S ∪ i ∪ j)v(S ∪ i ∪ j)+P| j (S ∪ j)v(S∪ j). (35)
Similarly, by definition of v−i together with (34), we get
P−i |¬ j (S) v−i (S) = P|¬ j (S ∪ i) v (S ∪ i) + P|¬ j (S) v (S) . (36)
One can then infer









[{P| j (S ∪ i ∪ j) v (S ∪ i ∪ j) + P| j (S ∪ j) v (S ∪ j)}





P| j (S ∪ j) v (S ∪ j) − P|¬ j (S) v (S) }
= ξ j (N , v, P),
where the second equality uses (35) and (36), and the third one follows by shifting the
corresponding terms from inside the square brackets to the outer summation.
8.2 Proof of Theorem 1
The proof proceeds in three steps. First, in Lemma 2 we prove for |N | = 2 that
linearity and consistency imply that an extended value is determined by unanimity
games. Second, we generalize this to all probabilistic games in Lemma 3. Finally,
we show that the full control property and IDDP characterize the PV for 2-player
probabilistic games and hence probabilistic games in general.
Lemma 2 Consider an extended value ϕ that is linear on the space of all 2-player
probabilistic games and consistent. For any set N with |N | = 2, the mapping
(N , v, P) → ϕ(N , v, P) is fully determined by the numbers
xi j := ϕi (N , u j , P) for i, j ∈ N . (37)
Proof Let P be a fixed probability distribution on 2N with N = {i, j}. The set of
unanimity games {ui , u j , ui j } forms a basis for the space of all TU games on N . In
particular, for any (N , v) ∈ GN there are constants αi , α j , αi j such that
v ≡ αi ui + α j u j + αi j ui j . (38)
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And thus, for arbitrary P and i ∈ N , ϕ’s linearity implies
ϕi (N , v, P) = αi ϕi (N , ui , P)︸ ︷︷ ︸
:=xii
+α j ϕi (N , u j , P)︸ ︷︷ ︸
:=xi j
+αi j ϕi (N , ui j , P)︸ ︷︷ ︸
:=xi,i j
. (39)
We need to show that xi,i j and x j,i j are fully determined by xii and xi j .
To see this, notice first that both players are dependent in (N , ui j , P). So we may
consider the reduced game obtained by j’s removal, which involves N− j = {i} and
P− j (∅) = P(∅) + P( j), P− j (i) = P(i) + P(i j),
(ui j )− j (∅) = 0, (ui j )− j (i) =
{
P(i j)
P(i)+P(i j) if P(i) + P(i j) > 0,
0 otherwise.
(40)
In case P(i) + P(i j) > 0, we have
ϕi (N , ui j , P) = ϕi
({i}, P(i j)P(i)+P(i j) · ui , P− j )
= P(i j)P(i)+P(i j) · ϕi ({i}, ui , P− j )
= P(i j)P(i)+P(i j) · ϕi (N , ui , P) = P(i j)P(i)+P(i j) · xii , (41)
where the first equality invokes consistency, the second linearity, and the third one
exploits that ({i}, ui , P− j ) is the reduction of (N , ui , P) by player j and again con-
sistency. When P(i) = P(i j) = 0 we have ϕi (N , ui j , P) = 0 because in this case
(ui j )− j ({i}) = 0 by Definition 4, so that (ui j )− j is the all-zero game 0 in that case.






P(i)+P(i j) · xii if P(i) + P(i j) > 0,
0 otherwise.
(42)
And in a similar fashion one obtains
x j,i j =
{
P(i j)




For any v ≡ αi ui + α j u j + αi j ui j we have
ϕi (N , v, P) =
{
α j · xi j +
(
αi + αi j ·P(i j)P(i)+P(i j)
)
· xii if P(i) + P(i j) > 0,
α j · xi j + αi · xii otherwise
(44)
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and an analogous expression for ϕ j (N , v, P). This finding can be generalized from
just two players to arbitrary N :
Lemma 3 Let ϕ be a consistent and linear extended value. Then the mapping
(N , v, P) → ϕ(N , v, P) is fully specified by the parameters in (37).




αT uT . (45)
Letting i ∈ N be an arbitrary but fixed player, we will use induction on n in order to
prove the following
Claim: There exist βi j , depending on the αT and P , such that
ϕi (N , v, P) =
n∑
j=1
βi j xi j where xi j := ϕi (N , u j , P). (46)
The claim is obvious for a single player and was proven for |N | = 2 in Lemma 2.
In view of linearity, it suffices to prove the statement for unanimity games uT , where
nothing needs to be shown when the cardinality of T is one. So we consider |N | ≥ 3,
|T | ≥ 2 and assume that the statement is true for all player sets N of cardinality n−1.
Let j ∈ N\i be a player, which must be dependent in uT because |T | ≥ 2. Now we
consider the reduced game (N− j , (uT )− j , P− j ). From consistency we conclude
ϕi (N , uT , P) = ϕi (N− j , (uT )− j , P− j ).
Applying the induction hypothesis implies the existence of β ′ik , which depend on P− j
and hence on P , such that
ϕi (N , uT , P) =
n∑
k=1,k = j
β ′ikϕi (N− j , uk, P− j ).
Since (uk)− j = uk the reduced game of (N , uk, P) is given by (N− j , uk, P− j ) for
all 1 ≤ k ≤ n with j = k. Inserting ϕi (N− j , uk, P− j ) = ϕi (N , uk, P) = xik then
proves the claim . unionsq
We remark that the coefficients βi j referred to in the above proof get quite com-
plicated for increasing n. In the following we will use only the fact that they are
well-defined given v and P .
Proof of Theorem 1. To complete the proof we now show how the values xii =
ϕi (N , ui , P) and xi j = ϕi (N , u j , P) can be computed from the corresponding values
for the player set N ′ = {i, j}. Since (ui )− j = ui for all i = j we can recursively
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conclude from consistency
ϕi (N , ui , P) = ϕi ({i, j}, ui , P) and (47)





P(S ∪ T ) for any S ⊆ {i, j}. (49)




P(S ∪ T ) for any S ⊆ {i}, (50)
we conclude ϕi ({i}, ui , P ′) = ϕi ({i, j}, ui , P) from consistency. Thus, the full con-
trol property, in connection with consistency and linearity, implies xii = 1 for all
player sets N (containing player i). If ϕ satisfies IDDP the values of xi j are deter-
mined, and hence ϕ is determined on the class of 2-player probabilistic games. Then
ϕ ≡ ξ follows from Lemma 3. Finally note that the full control property and IDDP do
not depend on the labeling of the players, which implies anonymity.
8.3 Proof of Lemma 1
(i) Linearity is inherited from the expected value EP|i .
To see consistency we first verify that EP− j |i ([uS]− j ) = EP|i (uS) for any probability




P− j (U ) = 0, then both sides of the equation are equal to




P− j (U ) > 0 in the following. For the reduced
game G− j = (N− j , v− j , P− j ) we have









P− j (T )∑
U⊆N\ j,
i∈U
P− j (U )
























{P(T ) + P(T ∪ j)} · [uS]− j (T ).
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Inserting (25) provides

















P(T ) · uS(T ) = EP|i (uS) .
Note that v− j = ∑S⊆N αS · [uS]− j and hence








αS · EP|i (uS)
= ϕ1i (N , v, P)
which confirms consistency of ϕ1.
Full control follows from ϕ1i ({i}, ui , P) = EP|i [ui (S)] = P|i({i}). This is 1 if
P({i}) > 0 and otherwise 0 by the definition of P|i .
In remains to be shown that ϕ1 does not satisfy IDDP. For the unanimity game u j
note that u j = ∑S⊆N αS · uS provides
αS =
{
1 for S = { j} ,
0 otherwise.
However, the summation in (27) is over all S with i ∈ S such that
ϕ1i ({i, j}, u j , P) = 0 (51)
in contradiction to (26).
(ii) ϕ2 inherits linearity and consistency from ξ and ϕ1. Inserting (51) into (28)
provides
ϕ2i ({i, j}, u j , P) = ξi ({i, j}, u j , P)
such that ϕ2i inherits IDDP from ξi . As both ξ and ϕ
1 satisfy full control we get
ϕ2i ({i}, ui , P) = 0,
in contradiction to Definition 7.
(iii) Linearity is obvious. For |N | ≤ 2 the extended value ϕ3 is identical to the PV and
the latter satisfies full control and IDDP. For a counterexample to consistency consider
a gameG− j = (N , v, P)with |N | = 3 and perfect correlation P(N ) = 1/2 = P(∅).
Here,
ϕ3i (N , v, P) = 0 for all i ∈ N . (52)
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However, for the reduced game G− j = (N− j , v− j , P− j ) we get
N− j = N\ j,
P− j (S) = P(S) + P(S ∪ j) for all S ⊆ N\ j
=
{
1/2 for S ∈ {N\ j, ∅} ,
0 otherwise,
v− j (S) =
{
v(N ) for S = N\ j,
0 otherwise.
For ϕ3 follows
ϕ3i (N− j , v− j , P− j ) = v(N ) − v(∅) = v(N ) for all i ∈ N
which contradicts (52).
(iv) Consider the reduced game G− j = (N− j , v− j , P− j ). PV is consistent and there-
fore
ξi (N− j , (uS)− j , P− j ) = ξi (N , uS, P) for all i ∈ N\ j .
We conclude
ϕ4i (N− j , v− j , P− j ) =
∑
S⊆N ,αS =0




ξi (N , uS, P) = ϕ4i (N , v, P) for all i ∈ N\ j
which confirms consistency of ϕ4i .
Full control and IDDP follows from ϕ4i ({i}, ui , P) = ξi ({i}, ui , P) and ϕ4i ({i, j}, u j ,
P) = ξi ({i, j}, u j , P).
To verify that ϕ4i is not linear put w =
∑
S⊆N βS · uS .
ϕ4i (N , v + w, P) =
∑
S⊆N ,αS+βS =0
ξi (N , uS, P)
which is in general not equal to
∑
S⊆N ,αS =0
ξi (N , uS, P) +
∑
S⊆N ,βS =0
ξi (N , uS, P).
unionsq
8.4 Proof of Theorem 2
The proof is based on three insights, stated in Lemmas 4–6.
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Lemma 4 From (·, Q) ≡ ξ(·, P) follows Qi (S) = P|i(S) for all {i} ⊆ S ⊆ N.
Proof For an arbitrary subset {i} ⊆ S ⊆ N we consider the unanimity game uS and
obtain the formulas
ξi (uS, P) =
∑
Ti
uS(T ) · P|i(T ) −
∑
T i





i (uS, Q) =
∑
{i}⊆T⊆N




Now we prove the proposed statement by induction on the subsets S in decreasing
order of their cardinalities using the assumption ξi (uS, P) = i (uS, Q). For the
induction start S = N we have P|i(N ) = Qi (N ). Using the induction hypothesis for
all S′ ⊆ N with |S′| > |S| yields P|i(S) = Qi (S). unionsq
Lemma 5 From (·, Q) ≡ ξ(·, P) follows P|i(U ) = P|¬i(U\i) for all {i} ⊆ U ⊆
N with |U | ≥ 2.
Proof We set U = N\S ∪ i so that we have to prove P|i(N\S ∪ i) = P|¬i(N\S)
for all subsets {i} ⊆ S  N .
For fixed S we consider the unanimity game uN\S and obtain the formulas
ξi (uN\S, P) =
∑
Ti
uN\S(T ) · P|i(T ) −
∑
T i





P|i(T ∪ i) − P|¬i(T )
)
and





uN\S(T ) − uN\S(T \i)
]
= 0.
Now we prove the proposed statement by induction on the subsets S in increasing
order of their cardinalities using the assumption ξi (uS, P) = (uS, Q). For the
induction start S = {i} we have P|i(N ) − P|¬i(N\i) = 0, which is equivalent
to P|i(N ) = P|¬i(N\{i}). Using the induction hypothesis for all S′ ⊆ N with
|S′| < |S| yields P|i(N\S ∪ i) = P|¬i(N\S). unionsq
Put pi := ∑Ti P(T ) ∈ [0, 1] for all i ∈ N . Whenever pi > 0 we have P|i(S) =
P(S)
pi
for all {i} ⊆ S ⊆ N and P|i(S) = 0 in all other cases. The next lemma excludes
the case pi = 1 for at least two players.
Lemma 6 If (·, Q) ≡ ξ(·, P) and if there exists an index i ∈ N with pi = 1, then
n = 1.
Proof From pi = ∑Ti P(T ) = 1 we conclude P(S) = 0 for all S ⊆ N\i . Thus
we have P|i(T ) = 0 for all T  i with |T | ≥ 2 due to Lemma 5. This yields
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P({i}) = Qi ({i}) = 1 and Q j (S) = 0 for all S  j , where (S, j) = ({i}, i), and all
j ∈ N due to Lemma 4. For each j ∈ N\i we then have ∑S j Q j (S) = 0 = 1 – a
contradiction. unionsq
Proof of Theorem 2. From Lemma 6 we conclude
0 ≤ pi :=
∑
Ti
P(T ) < 1
for all i ∈ N . If pi = 0 for an index i ∈ N , then we have Qi (S) = 0 due to Lemma 4,
which contradicts the definition of the Qi (S). Thus we have 0 < pi < 1. Later on it
will turn out that indeed we can choose p˜i = pi .
We have
P(S) = pi
1 − pi · P(S\i)
for all S  i with |S| ≥ 2 due to Lemma 5 and pi > 0.





1 − p j · P({i})
for all i ∈ N and all subsets S  i of N .




















1 − p j .
Thus we have
P({i}) = pi ·
∏
j∈N\i








(1 − p j ) (53)
for all ∅ = S ⊆ N . By using ∑S⊆N P(S) = 1 we conclude that equation (53) is also
valid for the empty set and thus for all subsets of N .
Lemma 4 and a short calculation gives also the first formula of the proposed statement.
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i.e., P is a product measure. Next set







1 − p j
)
,
for i ∈ N\S, i.e. the Qi (S ∪ i) derive from the same product measure. We can easily
verify P|i(S) = P|¬i(S\i) for all S  i and all i ∈ N . Inserting this into the definition
of the prediction value provides ξ(·, P) = (·, Q). unionsq
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